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Christopher Lasch‖s The Culture of Narcissism 
 
The Failure of a Critique of Psychological Politics 
 
Jan De Vos 
GHENT UNIVERSITY 
 
 
ABSTRACT. Christopher Lasch‖s bestseller The Culture of Narcissism had, beyond 
doubt, a significant impact—it was even read in the White House. Today it is not 
only still frequently taught and referenced, there are also still empirical studies 
conducted which try to verify Lasch‖s assertion of the preponderance of the nar-
cissistic personality. This paper re-reads the book as a critique of psychologization 
processes, and this allows us to discern, besides the flaws in Lasch‖s approach, a 
fundamental insight which goes largely unnoticed by both Lasch‖s opponents and 
his proponents. Following this, the article will situate subjectivity within the ma-
trix of psychology, science, psychoanalysis, and politics. In this way a critique of 
contemporary forms of psychologization—psychologization under globalization, 
as it were—is made possible.  
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The history of psychology is also the history of the processes of psychologization. Study-
ing the late-modern processes of psychologization, it is not possible to ignore Christo-
pher Lasch‖s The Culture of Narcissism (1978). For my purpose here, I start with a mini-
mal definition of psychologization as being the phenomenon of how the psy-sciences 
became a hegemonic discourse delivering particular signifiers and discursive schemes 
for looking upon oneself and upon the world. In this sense Lasch‖s bestseller is beyond 
doubt one of the most influential attempts to analyse therapeutic culture and what he 
terms the advent of the narcissistic personality in the Cold War era. However, a closer 
reading reveals not only that Lasch‖s culture critique is biased by a conservative agenda, 
but also that Lasch went astray concerning an important point in his analysis: namely, 
that he considers it possible to develop a critique of psychologization working from a 
meta-psychological use of psychoanalysis. However, the fact that Lasch did somehow 
strike a deep chord, I claim, is often misunderstood by both his opponents and his pro-
ponents. We might call Lasch‖s fundamental insight a critique of psychological politics. In 
this paper I will argue that Lasch‖s, as such perfectly defendable, recourse to psycho-
analysis faltered where he failed to think his own stance to the end, and where he fell 
back into a critique of political psychology. It is here that Lasch gets bogged down in a ster-
ile and fruitless meta-psychological critique of the processes of psychologization. This 
engagement with the limits of Lasch‖s critique of psychological politics will, further-
more, prove useful for assessing today‖s post-Cold War processes of psychologization. In 
other words, it will offer us an insight into the place of psychology in these times of 
globalization. I will begin by pointing out why and how Lasch‖s The Culture of Narcissism 
should be read as a critique of psychologization 
 
 
The Culture of Narcissism as a Critique of Psychologization 
 
Therapeutic justice perpetuates childlike dependence 
into adulthood and deprives the citizen of legal resources 
against the state. (Lasch, 1978, p. 229) 
 
… the welfare system socializes the “human costs” of 
capitalist production …and helps to forestall more radical 
solutions. (Lasch, 1978, p. 234) 
 
Everybody is now familiar with such critiques; in fact, so familiar that all our nuanced 
responses to these positions have rendered them quite superficial. The least one can say 
is that these criticisms are not within the central scope of today‖s psy-theories and psy-
praxes, but more than that may have changed. Consider, for example, the title of an ar-
ticle in the APA journal Monitor on Psychology: “Wanted: Politics-Free, Science-Based 
Education” (Murray, 2002). We are no longer concerned with how the psy-sciences in-
terfere with politics, but, rather, we are concerned that politics might compromise the 
purity of a science-based psy-praxis. The article promotes the idea that politically moti-
vated, fad-of-the-month educational practices should be replaced by educational tech-
niques grounded in solid scientific evidence. Thus, some 30 years after Christopher 
Lasch‖s plea to reduce the influence of the psy-experts on our everyday life-world, this 
has been superseded by a plea to keep the politicians out of what is understood as the 
proper domain of the psy-experts.  
It is useful to return to Lasch‖s The Culture of Narcissism (1978) in order to understand 
this shift. Lasch‖s book is often cited (possibly more referenced than read) and dis-
cussed—albeit mostly in sciences other than those connected to the psy-praxes. One 
reason it has continued to receive attention is that it has led to some prolonged and 
harsh controversies. Robert Boyers (2004) describes Lasch‖s book as having been fiercely 
criticized from the very beginning for its alleged emotional intensity and its “scornful” 
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or “dismissive” tone. When faced with high-pitched emotionality, academia necessarily 
gets very … emotional. Furthermore, Lasch used psychoanalytic concepts in such a com-
pelling and engaging way to explain Tom Wolfe‖s idea of the “Me Decade” that in order 
to respond properly, critics were forced, reluctantly, to acknowledge some of his basic 
theoretical views.1  
One of the traditional critiques of Lasch is that his study lacked empirical evidence to 
support the belief that pathological forms of narcissism had increased (Kilminster, 2008; 
Tyler, 2007). Nevertheless, as Imogen Tyler (2007) points out, Lasch‖s argument that an 
increasingly liberal, secular, affluent, and consumer-orientated post-war American soci-
ety had led to the narcissistic personality quickly became established as common sense. 
And this might be precisely the point, the empirical fact that Lasch somehow struck a 
deep chord. Is this not comparable to the constitutive effect of French movie critics 
identifying film noir as a category in the history of American cinema? As Slavoj Žižek 
(2000a, p. 243) argues, it was their distant and even distorted perspective on American 
cinema which engendered film noir as a genre as such. Ultimately, the success of Lasch‖s 
book may have boiled down to its production of a social reality: namely, a society which 
regards itself as entering a narcissistic “Me Decade.” It is, then, less interesting to pin-
point his misunderstandings and attempt to recover the real behind his assertions than 
it is to endeavour to understand how a society so easily fell into the grip of Tom Wolfe‖s 
“Me Decade” and Lasch‖s narcissistic personality.  
In this way Richard Kilminster, in his critique of the lack of evidence underpinning 
Lasch‖s diagnosis, is absolutely right in contending that Lasch dramatizes the issue to 
convince his readers of his point of view (Kilminster, 2008, p. 139). The problem with 
such critiques, however, is that they, from their narrow empirical point of view, fail to 
explain why Lasch dramatized the issue of narcissism that convincingly.2 To begin with, 
is it not clear that Kilminster‖s plea for a “detached analysis of the psychic costs of cur-
rent social trends” (p. 147) concerns exactly the detached, academic position the prolif-
eration of which was criticized by Lasch? Central in Lasch‖s Culture of Narcissism is the 
critique of therapeutic culture and the growing psychologization, educationalization, 
and, in general, academization of everyday life: “… no aspect of contemporary thought 
has proved immune to educationalization. The university has boiled all experience 
down into “courses” of study. … In its eagerness to embrace experience, the university 
                                                          
 
 
1  This may also hold true for other controversial writers, such as Slavoj Žižek, who is clearly indebted to 
Lasch, and whose theoretical idiosyncrasies, like Lasch‖s, are difficult to engage with without partially going 
along with them. Hence the emotional and harsh criticism their work often receives. 
2 For another instance of how central dramatization is in the constitution of psychological theory, see De Vos 
(2009). 
comes to serve as a substitute for it” (Lasch, 1978, p. 153). So when recent studies which 
revisit Lasch try to pinpoint whether or not contemporary social and behavioural trends 
would affect Lasch‖s diagnosis (e.g., Trzesniewski, Donnellan, & Robins, 2008; Twenge, 
Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008), they miss the fact that their academic and 
limited empirical understanding of reality is exactly what was being targeted by Lasch 
in the first place. Moreover, what they equally fail to account for in their narrow aim of 
studying how contemporary trends would affect Lasch‖s diagnosis is the effect which 
Lasch‖s diagnosis itself had on society. Is, for example, the very effect of Lasch‖s critique 
of narcissistic culture not that it turned our gaze inwards? In other words, is it Lasch‖s 
own stance which engendered introspective navelgazing? Here a further paradox 
emerges. What Lasch places in opposition to the psychologized and academified outlook 
on everyday life is a metapsychological point of view. Is not the first conclusion we 
should make here that the processes of psychologization are, themselves, essential to 
their own critique? In other words, Lasch is part and parcel of the psychologization 
processes of the 1960s and 1970s which he describes so engagingly. The critique on psy-
chologization cannot but coincide with the very phenomenon of psychologization itself. 
Laying it bare makes it exist and, in this way, the critique engenders the necessary re-
flexive perspective central to psychologization itself. Lasch‖s Culture of Narcissism is, 
thus, foremost a landmark in a society engaged in a self-contemplative, narcissistic 
stance.  
It is only in reading The Culture of Narcissism as a critique on psychologization and 
academization that a second traditional critique on Lasch, his so-called conservative lef-
tism (see, e.g., Barrett & McIntosh, 1982), can be reframed. Lasch is often reproached for 
pathologizing emancipatory politic movements. Tyler, for example, criticizes Lasch for 
attributing narcissism to stereotyped figures (sexually liberated women, feminists, ca-
reer women, African-Americans, gays and lesbians, etc.) in order to promote white het-
erosexual masculine and patriarchal forms of sociality. For Tyler (2007), Lasch speaks in 
the interests of those sections of the American population threatened by the radical so-
cial politics of the 1960s and the 1970s. Lasch‖s aversion to identity politics, as it would be 
called today, is beyond doubt, and this does give his thesis a clearly nostalgic and con-
servative undertone.3 But he does not so much attribute narcissism to African-
Americans, for example, as point to white Americans‖ strange adoption and imitation of 
                                                          
 
 
3 Identity politics is usually understood as political activity or theorizing on the basis of a cultural, racial, 
gender, ethnic, or other claim. Eric Hobsbawm (1996) sees the emergence of identity politics as a consequence 
of the “extraordinarily rapid and profound upheavals and transformations of human society” (p. 40) at the 
end of the 20th century, and the consequent weakening of both the nation-state and the old class-based politi-
cal parties and movement. 
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what they suppose to be a ghetto style. Furthermore, he argues that the so-called 
“emancipatory movements” patronized by white middle-class academia often engender 
precisely that which they try to combat. Lasch contends, for example, that the educa-
tional radicalism of the late 1960s not only left the status quo intact, but actually rein-
forced it. While striving to validate subcultures, it condemned the lower classes to a 
secondrate education, thereby perpetuating inequality (Lasch, 1978, p. 145). For Lasch, 
radical educational reformers‖ insistence on racial pride is a false solution. Here he 
quotes Kenneth Clark saying that “black children or any other group of children can‖t 
develop pride by just saying they have it, by singing a song about it” (as cited in Lasch, 
1978, p. 144).  
So when Barrett and McIntosh (1982) criticize Lasch‖s approach to feminism, and 
Tobin Siebers (2002) accuses Lasch of summoning narcissism “against black studies, 
women‖s studies and, more recently, disability studies” (p. 41), these critics miss the 
point that his critique does not concern members of political minorities as such. It con-
cerns, rather, the studies. Even today, 30 years after Lasch‖s book, it is clear that the dy-
namics of different identity politics are essentially an academic matter. This should be 
questioned: What is the effect of the academic appropriation of politic struggles? Does 
not the term studies take the sting out of the emancipatory moment? At the very least, 
we should consider the effects of emancipatory movements getting caught in empirical 
demands, publication strategies, academic career planning, and fund-raising issues. 
Thus, Lasch does not essentially pathologize minority groups and their emancipatory 
potential; his primary target is academia. However, we should not entirely brush away 
the critique of Lasch‖s conservative undertow, which Slavoj Žižek (2000b) refers to as 
“neo-conservative populism” (p. 221), pointing to Lasch‖s arguments for the reassertion 
of community, local democracy, and active citizenship as the answer to the bureaucrati-
zation and instrumentalization of our life-world. Our hypothesis, rather, is that this nos-
talgia emerges exactly at the point where he cannot fully grasp the inherent paradoxes 
of academia. As Boyers puts it, Lasch‖s emphasis on order and authority is problematic 
not only because he aligns himself with conservative thinkers, but primarily because it 
marks a largely unacknowledged contradiction in his thinking (Boyers, 2004, p. 12). This 
contradiction can be understood, as we will show in the next section, as Lasch‖s reach-
ing a deadlock in his attempt to ground his critique of psychologization in a metapsy-
chological use of psychoanalysis.  
 
 
Lost in Psychologization 
 
Lasch tried to grasp the dynamics of academization and psychologization in order to get 
a grip on the bureaucratization and instrumentalization of our life-world. In this way he 
wanted to create a theoretical safe haven for the “besieged family.” As just another con-
tingent social unit, without independent weight, the family is an easy victim for both 
the state and the capitalist market (Anderson, 1995). In this context Lasch used psycho-
analytic theory to bolster the status of the family and, thus, to safeguard it from coloni-
zation. For Lasch, neither mainstream psychology nor the mainstream critiques of psy-
chology could accomplish this task as both misunderstand how the socialization of pro-
duction proved to be the prelude to the socialization of reproduction itself (Lasch, 1978, p. 
154).4 For Lasch, alongside probation officers and physicians, psychologists and psychia-
trists entered the juvenile court to erode the rights of the ordinary citizen (p. 157). He is, 
however, also critical of oppositional movements: for example, reformers who oppose 
the extraction of children from their families, wanting to save the family as a whole. For 
Lasch, these reformers still accept the premise that the family cannot manage without 
external assistance (p. 160). He also points to false critiques influenced by “debased ver-
sions of Freudian theory” which promote a kind of permissiveness in the name of child-
ren’s needs. Lasch refers here to Dr. Spock‖s Baby and Child Care (1951), which opens with 
the anti-expert phrase “Trust yourself.” Such stances, Lasch argues, do not lead to a 
withdrawal of the experts; on the contrary, they only widen the scope of their claims, 
setting themselves up as the doctors for all of society (p. 163).  
But then the question, of course, is whether Lasch himself can escape that position, 
whether his The Culture of Narcissism is not meant as a self-help book for the whole of 
society. Let us follow Lasch where he tries to analyse the cultural malaise, the discon-
tents of his era. He writes:  
Today Americans are overcome not by the sense of endless possibility but by the 
banality of the social order they have erected against it. …they feel themselves 
overwhelmed by an annihilating boredom, like animals whose instincts have 
withered in captivity. (p. 11)  
Lasch tries to comprehend this captivity through a Marxist framework; capitalists took 
production out of the household and collectivized it, appropriated the workers‖ skills 
and technical knowledge, and brought these skills together under managerial direction. 
At the same time they extended their control over the workers‖ private lives: “… as doc-
tors, psychiatrists, teachers, child guidance experts, officers of the juvenile courts, and 
other specialists began to supervise child-rearing, formerly the business of the family” 
                                                          
 
 
4 In 1910 Ellen Richards wrote: “…the child as a future citizen is an asset of the state, not the property of its 
parents” (as cited in Lasch, 1978, p. 155)—only recently, Ankie Vandekerckhove, a Flemish Children‖s Rights 
official argued that the government should force its way into the family as the last private cell of society (“Bemidde-
ling,” 2004). 
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(Lasch, 1977, pp. xiv–xv). The double alienation and double banality of this heartless 
world make men want to recapture something of the lost empty wilderness:  
A reversion to savagery threatens them so little that they long precisely for a 
more vigorous instinctual existence. People nowadays complain of an inability to 
feel. They cultivate more vivid experiences, seek to beat sluggish flesh to life, at-
tempt to revive jaded appetites. (Lasch, 1978, p. 11)  
The confinements of modern life thus lead to a quest for the real thing. Aren‖t we here 
encountering Alain Badiou‖s (2003) passion for the real? Besieged by managers and psy-
experts—the elimination of empty spaces via globalization has paranoiac effects 
(McGowan, 2005)—we look for something beyond those constraints, something firm and 
real. But, and here we come to a crucial question in Lasch and in the psy-critique as a 
whole, what is that longed-for real thing beyond alienation? At this point, Lasch makes 
the leap from a Marxist analysis to socio-pathology, and he begins to…psychologize. His 
nostalgia is a nostalgia for the pre-psychologized individual and pre-therapeutic society, 
and this leads him back to psychology, or, better, to meta-psychology.  
Twentieth-century peoples have erected so many psychological barriers against 
strong emotions, and have invested those defenses with so much of the energy de-
rived from forbidden impulse, that they can no longer remember what it feels like 
to be inundated by desire. (Lasch, 1978, p. 11)  
Lasch‖s critique of psychologization and the pre-conceived haven of the family as de-
signed by the psy-experts leads him to search for authenticity. In the process, however, 
signifiers like psychological barriers reinsert Lasch within a psychological discourse; he 
meta-psychologizes desire. As always, when  one is seeking authenticity, at a given point 
a (meta-)theory enters the frame. Already in the introduction to The Culture of Narcissism, 
Lasch defends himself against the reproach of nostalgia with psychologizing arguments. 
For example, he resorts to the “psychoanalytic insight that loving memories constitute 
an indispensable psychological resource in maturity” (Lasch, 1978, p. xvii). Lasch‖s use of 
psychoanalysis as a meta-psychology runs throughout the book.  
In his critique of mainstream psy-theories of sexuality, for example, Lasch (1978) re-
marks that the promotion of sex as a “healthy” and “normal” part of life masks a desire 
to divest it of the emotional intensity unavoidably clinging to it:  
Today men and women seek escape from emotion not only because they have suf-
fered wounds in the wars of love but because they experience their own inner im-
pulses as intolerably urgent and menacing. The flight from feeling originates not 
only in the sociology of the sex war but in the psychology that accompanies it. (p. 
201)  
Lasch‖s view is that, primarily, there is a psychological problem, and it is this itself 
which becomes psychologized in mainstream theories. Is psychologization not effectively 
a denial of the psychical dimension, while, unintentionally, the coercive theoretical 
models narrow down the subjective space? But if psychology is the problem and psy-
choanalysis the solution, then what is it that Lasch gives us? With his invocation of 
phallic breasts, vagina dentata, and castrating mothers (Lasch, 1978, p. 203), we could be 
forgiven for seeing Lasch as the Freudian sans merci, piling up Freudianisms and inviting 
rejection by the academy. The question is, however: Can Lasch guarantee that this Freu-
dian approach will not have the same de-psychologizing effects? Take, for example, his 
view that late-modern culture imposes an ironic, pseudo-analytic self-awareness as a 
kind of “second nature.” In opposition, he cites the American psychoanalyst Heinz Ko-
hut:  
Those who feel secure in the ego‖s ability to control the id, according to Kohut, 
take pleasure in occasionally suspending the secondary process (for example, in 
sleep or in sexual activity), since they know they can regain it when they wish to. 
(Lasch, 1978, p. 97)  
Paradoxically this is similar to Dr. Spock‖s “Trust yourself”; it boils down to the advice to 
skip the Cartesian reflex, to put the psyche itself on hold. Furthermore, Lasch‖s be au-
thentic and everything will work out fine still presupposes the mediation of the psy-expert 
on two accounts: first, it is the scientist who can discern authenticity from inauthentici-
ty; and, second, it is the scientist who knows what the rewards of this authenticity are. 
This then engenders the quintessential questions of late-modern subjectivity: Can I be 
authentic? Am I normal enough? Am I human enough? Am I not always viewing my own life from 
an external position?  
This would bring us to the more contemporary forms of psychologization, but before 
we turn to these, let us go beyond our critique of Lasch and try to  discern what his fun-
damental insight into the processes of psychologization is. After all, his recourse to psy-
choanalysis was the right move, but, as we shall see, Lasch failed in that he thought that 
the relationship between psychoanalysis and the social is a simple one, presuming that 
psychoanalytical theory could fully cover the social and political field. Our claim is that 
Lasch did strike a deep chord here, which is often misunderstood by both his opponents 
and his proponents. We might term Lasch‖s fundamental insight here the critique of 
psychological politics. It is, however, a fundamental insight which he did not pursue to 
the end.  
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
Lasch‖s Fundamental Insight: The Critique of Psychological Politics  
 
For Lasch, having displaced religion as the organizing framework of American culture, 
the therapeutic outlook threatens also to displace politics by transforming collective 
grievances into personal problems amenable to therapeutic intervention (Lasch, 1978, 
pp. 13–14). Lasch strongly opposes decision making becoming the prerogative of tech-
nical expertise and deplores the loss of the ethical dimension in public life in favour of 
consumerism (Lasch, 1985). Although he—as argued above—tends to metapsychologize 
the very thing he wants to rescue from psychologization and therapeutization, there is, 
nevertheless, in his thinking on politics, something which escapes this stance. So even if 
Lasch‖s critique begins with the presupposition that in pre-therapeutic times there was 
a place for genuine politics and genuine public engagement, his analysis goes beyond 
this and therefore supersedes the more superficial analysis of his contemporaries such 
as Richard Sennett (1977). For Lasch (1978), experiences of inner emptiness, loneliness, 
and inauthenticity are by no means unreal or devoid of social content. It is “the devasta-
tion of personal life” and not the retreat into privatism (claimed by Sennett) that needs 
to be criticized and condemned (p. 27). Thus, Lasch criticizes Sennett‖s romantic mourn-
ing for lost sincerity and authenticity in the realm of social exchange, which have ap-
parently given way to more individualistic tendencies. For Lasch, the cult of intimacy 
originates not in the assertion of personality, but in its collapse (p. 30). His critique of 
mainstream forms of therapy is that they intensify the diseases they pretend to cure:  
They do this, however, not by diverting attention from social problems to person-
al ones, from real issues to false issues, but by obscuring the social origins of the 
suffering—not to be confused with complacent selfabsorption— that is painfully 
but falsely experienced as purely personal and private. (p. 30)  
Thus, for Lasch, a false psychologizing of the social origins of suffering is central and 
results in these problems being experienced as personal/private. This is pretty close to 
what Žižek considers critical theory should be about. It should assume not that we have 
the wrong idea of how things really are, but that we have the wrong idea of how in reality things 
are mystified (Žižek, 2005).  
For Lasch, therapeutic culture is not about transforming real issues into false issues. 
The antagonism is already present at the level of the real issue of the social itself, which 
is to say we are dealing with the “social origins of the suffering” and these are subse-
quently psychologized within therapeutic culture. In other words, Lasch tries to situate 
subjectivity on the axis of the social and the suffering, or, put more concisely, he under-
stands subjectivity as the fact of being subjected to the social or, more generally, to the 
outside world. It is this Spaltung, to put it in Freudian terms, this dividedness of the sub-
ject, which is then illegitimately transferred to the personal and the private in the 
process of psychologization.  
To push this further, Lasch‖s “social origins of the suffering” can be given two names: 
subjectivity and politics. For, are we here not very close to Marx‖s Critique of Political Eco-
nomy? Žižek argues that the Critique of Political Economy essentially maintains the idea 
that the economy is itself political. For Žižek, the political class struggle permeates the 
entire analysis from the very beginning. Political economy is not about objective socio-
economic data, but rather it is about “data which always signal the outcome of a politi-
cal struggle” (Žižek, 2006, p. 566). In the same way, Lasch‖s “social origins of the suffer-
ing” should be understood as indicating that the field of the social (the field of the pub-
lic and the political) is itself already “psychological.” The public realm is not exclusively 
concerned with objective social problems but is already infused by the dimension of the 
psychological and the subjective. This is Lasch‖s fundamental insight. This is his critique 
of psychological politics.  
Let us approach this from the perspective of Lasch‖s critique of radical politics in the 
1960s. Discussing these radicals‖ turn, in the 1970s, to the therapeutic discourses and 
practices of self-realization, Lasch claims that their original engagement with radical 
politics already served as a “refuge from the terrors of the inner life” (Lasch, 1978, p. 
15). Their turn to politics was already a form of therapy. The therapeutic outlook of the 
1970s laid bare the psychologizing undertow of 1960s radicalization. As long as politics 
attracts “those who seek to drown the sense of personal failure in collective action,” (p. 
15) it will have little to say about the personal dimension of social crisis. For Lasch, poli-
tics must explain why “personal growth and development have become so hard to ac-
complish” (p. 16). Put differently, therapeutic culture, for Lasch, is not a false solution 
for real political problems (the displacing of politics to psy-matters); rather, it is thera-
peutic culture which shows that the real political problems are situated in the psy-
realm, or, more concisely, in the sphere of subjectivity.   
This is where Lasch‖s stance is original, but also where the trap of metapsychology 
lurks. As noted above, this is where he seems to open the way to accusations of essen-
tialism and can be understood as adopting the perspective of real politicians dealing with 
real psychological problems. It is where he succumbs to a critique of political psychology that 
his analysis of the social origins of suffering leads to a deadlock. It is not that his political 
analysis fails and then he starts to babble psychology. Neither is it that his psychological 
analysis fails and then he starts to babble politics. It is rather that he fails to theorize the 
very connection between politics and psychology.  
To begin with, it is clear that the knot between politics and subjectivity should be 
understood historically, for is not the modern subject of the Enlightenment essentially a 
political entity? Sidetracking God led to the birth of the autonomous State, on the one 
hand, and what is generally believed to be the autonomous Individual, on the other. The 
two levels appear to define each other: no State exists without the autonomous, rational 
Individual (the principle of democracy) and there can be no Individual without an auto-
nomous, rational State (the principle of the rule of law). This makes the modern subject 
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both political and psychological. This intertwining is structurally problematic: to bor-
row Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe‖s terms, it inhibits the full realization of both 
the subject and society (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). The subject cannot be fully realized, 
cannot fully equal itself, because society is not a unified, rational whole, fully equal to 
itself. At the same time, society cannot attain full positive being because the individual 
subject never realizes full subjectivity, never equals itself. The lack of being on the one 
side always returns on the other.  
But we have to take this line of thought still one step further, for it is at this point 
that academia enters as the necessary go-between: science, belonging to neither the 
subjective nor the political domain, is what knots the two together. Before the Enligh-
tenment, humanity lived in a world where God was present in everything, whether liv-
ing or not. This emanation, God as the common denominator, mediated humanity‖s pres-
ence, its being in the world. When, in the Renaissance, the word “psychology” was 
coined—by historians of psychology traditionally attributed to Rudolf Goclenius (1547–
1628)— something must have changed. As Jacques Claes (1982) puts it, in a gradual 
process of secularization, humanity became more and more disentangled from the 
world and there psychology emerged as a mediator; it had to reconnect humanity with 
an ever-receding world. With Descartes, God was completely cut loose from the world. 
God was made the bearer of the link between humanity (res cogito) and the world (res 
extensa). La Mettrie pushed this further still by denying the res cogito any substance: the 
modern subject had to acknowledge that even its doubting and thinking were but as-
pects of the material world. This led to what Claes calls the second birth of psychology in 
Gustav Theodor Fechners‖s psychophysics. Indeed, one can understand psychophysics 
as a psychology that attempted to ground the physics of humanity‖s being of and being 
in the world. Fechner‖s psychology had to reconcile humanity with the modern, rapidly 
technologizing, world. It had to design a new place for humanity to inhabit.  
The paradox, already present in the work of La Mettrie, however, is that this still pre-
supposes a point from which humanity looks upon itself, a point outside res extensa: a 
zero level of subjectivity. The modern subject regards itself with the academic gaze, be-
coming an academic agent, radically cut off the world; this is where the subject is al-
ready dead, or should we say “undead”? This new Narcissus looks like one of Andreas 
Vesalius‖s skeletons, leaning on a tomb disinterestedly contemplating a skull (see the 
plate called “secunda ossium tabula,” Vesalius, 1601).5  
This is the shift Lasch misses. He fails to account for the narcissistic phenomena he 
encountered in the 1970s and 1980s in terms of the history of the modern subject. He 
                                                          
 
 
5 The plate can be found at: http://portal.unesco.org/ci/photos/showphoto.php/photo/4200/size/big.546  
does not trace these phenomena back to the Cartesian subject, constituting itself via the 
academic gaze. Furthermore, it is important to understand the crucial role psychoanaly-
sis played in that history. Did not Freud come in where Fechner‖s psychophysics failed? 
Freud tried to theorize not only the link between the modern subject and the world, but, 
most importantly, the structural failure of that link. That is where Freud situates symp-
toms and the unconscious. Although the Enlightenment showed God the door, the tech-
nology and science which arose in His place turned out to be structurally incapable of 
providing modern humanity with a place in the world, with a definite ontological status. 
It is precisely there, in the breaches of the project of modernity, that Freudian theory 
situated subjectivity. Thus, as the theory of Spaltung and Unbehagen, of the modern sub-
ject‖s splitting and unease, psychoanalysis created the possibility of thinking a new link 
between the subject and its world via the subject‖s symptoms. Maybe this solution, of 
Freudian symptomatology as a coping mechanism in relation to modernity‖s structural 
paradox, is what leaves Freud‖s ideas stranded in late modernity. Lasch‖s claim regard-
ing psychopathology shifting to the narcissistic personality disorders could then be un-
derstood in terms of a deadlock of the Freudian paradigm. Think of Verhaeghe‖s idea 
that the traditional psychotherapies (modeled on Freudian psychoanalysis) fail to an-
swer the so-called new symptomatology (Verhaeghe, 2007), or of Jacques-Alain Miller‖s 
assertion that psychoanalytical discourse (i.e., know your desire) became its own victim, 
realizing in society a kind of perversion of itself in a consumerist-hypercapitalistic dis-
course (i.e., free your desire; Miller, 2005).  
The least one can say is that the narcissistic crisis Lasch is trying to describe is itself 
caught up in this history of the modern subject and in the history of the sciences them-
selves. Psychoanalysis played a central role in that history and, thus, is an important 
factor in shaping modern and late-modern culture. Lasch‖s critique of psychological pol-
itics falters where he misses the place of science (and the specific position of psychoana-
lysis in science) within modernity as the mediator of what we have called psycho-
political subjectivity. It is exactly in historicizing this constellation that one could try to 
account for supposed changes in the psyche of modern and late-modern humanity, 
right up to the present. On the one hand Lasch does try to account for the science‖s en-
croachment on humanity‖s life-world. He recognizes that instead of serving a general 
enlightenment, science actually reactivated “infantile appetites and the infantile need 
for illusions” in its “never-ending series of technological miracles, wonder-working 
drugs and cures” (Lasch, 1981, p. 32). On the other hand, however, he fails to recognize 
the role psychoanalysis itself played in providing the imagery for the reflexivity of the 
modern subject and, in so doing, he ends up reappropriating psychoanalysis as a meta-
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psychology. Just think how, in these post-psychoanalytical times, Freudianism has as-
sumed a semi-conscious presence in advertising and entertainment, providing a cogni-
tive mapping, as it were, for these technological miracles, these wonder-working drugs 
and cures.6 So, if Lasch, leaning on Kohut, can be understood to be promoting the possi-
bility of an unmediated authentic being in the world (to be believed accessible by psy-
choanalytical means), he misses the paradox of modern subjectivity in its very relation 
to psychoanalysis and psychology.  
For, is not the gist of a mediated being in the world that we are not merely conscious 
of the world, but that we are conscious of our consciousness? And if God was once the 
guarantee of this “balance exercise,” in the Enlightenment science took over. Modern 
consciousness of consciousness meant that the birth of the modern psyche—the Carte-
sian subject of which Freudian psychoanalysis was the first consequent elaboration—
necessitated a psychology. Psychoanalysis is never enough; it has to be topped by psy-
chology (to amend, clarify, criticize, deform, deny, or refute psychoanalysis). Modern 
reflexivity thus emerges as always already trapped in its own mediation. The appropri-
ate response here is to turn Lasch‖s idea around, to view psychoanalysis as the problem 
to which psychology provides an answer, which is to say, psychology is the lie which 
points to the truth which necessarily escapes psychoanalysis. It is to this dimension of 
the truth that I will turn in the last section, where I will try to assess today‖s post-Cold 
War processes of psychologization, starting with an engagement with the limits of 
Lasch‖s critique of psychological politics.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
6 Lasch also goes astray analysing so called “naïve” popular culture (Lasch, 1978, p. 95), which he still regards 
as something that can be scientifically and, particularly, psychoanalytically deconstructed. Lasch misses the 
fact that when we encounter phallic breasts and vagina dentate, it might be that popular culture itself is draw-
ing upon psychoanalytic imagery. The presence of Freudian themes in popular culture can thus be considered 
the return of a repressed imaginary. Incest, oedipal constellations, castration, and so on, these are, as it were, 
the after-effects, the after-images of a theory now being rejected in mainstream academia. So we should not, 
for example, take the vulva-eye of Sauron on its phallic tower in the movie The Lord of the Rings at its face val-
ue, as do Ruth Goldberg and Krin Gabbard (2006), but instead regard it as a prime example of psychoanalytic 
imagery re-emerging in popular culture. This also offers one possible response to the criticism that Lasch 
misused and misappropriated Freudian terminology (Boyers, 2004). Lasch did not appropriate Freudian termi-
nology for the analysis of the modern condition of subjectivity. Freud‖s terminology was there from the be-
ginning. 
Psychologization in Times of Globalization  
 
In The Culture of Narcissism Lasch is primarily concerned with identifying the fundamen-
tal shift in late-modern subjectivity; a shift he defined as economic man giving way to 
psychological man, the final product of bourgeois individualism. He writes:  
The new narcissist is haunted not by guilt but by anxiety. … His sexual attitudes 
are permissive rather than puritanical, even though his emancipation from an-
cient taboos brings him no sexual peace. … [The narcissist] demands immediate 
gratification and lives in a state of restless, perpetually unsatisfied desire (Lasch, 
1978, p. xvi)  
Consider then this account, some 30 years later:  
Indeed, instead of phobias, we meet with panic disorders. Instead of conversion 
symptoms, we find somatization disorder. Instead of hysterical nausea, there are 
eating disorders. With some exaggeration, it can be said that yesterday‖s docile 
psychoneurotic patient who dreamt of forbidden sexual activities resulting in 
massive feelings of guilt that lead to phobic and obsessional symptoms, that this 
patient has almost disappeared. Instead of that, we are confronted with the pro-
miscuous, aggressive borderline patient who combines eating disorders with ad-
dictions and self mutilation. (Verhaeghe, 2007, p. 7)  
Is Paul Verhaeghe‖s account somewhat belatedly describing the same shift in psychopa-
thology? Are we dealing with shifting or returning sociopathologies? Lasch himself al-
ready had similar difficulties distinguishing his narcissistic subjectivity from earlier ac-
counts of the modern individual. At the end of the 19th century, there were already re-
ports of radical changes in subjectivity, and “atomizing individualism.” Lasch quotes 
Brownson, who, echoing Marx, wrote in 1875: “…all that was dissoluble had been dis-
solved. All that was destructible had been destroyed” (as cited in Lasch, 1978, p. 9). So 
Lasch had to distinguish between his new narcissist and the old rugged individualist. If, 
for the latter, the world was “an empty wilderness to be shaped by his own design,” 
then for the narcissist, the world is a mirror. Apparently free from family ties and insti-
tutional constraints, the narcissist can only overcome his insecurity by seeing his 
“grandiose self” reflected in the attentions of others, or by attaching himself to those 
who radiate celebrity, power, and charisma (Lasch, 1978, p. 10).  
Lasch has a point here: in the course of the history of modernity, the world did in-
deed stop being that empty wildernesses. Modern subjects came to live in a charted 
world. The emptiness made way for a cathected world, to use a Freudian term. But, tradi-
tionally, this charting divides the world in two: our world versus the other world; the 
modern world versus the pre-modern world; or the cultured world versus the primitive 
world. Of course, this builds on the earlier antagonism between the Christian and the 
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pagan (not yet Christian) world, but one can argue that with the Enlightenment, the 
antagonism changed decisively: science and technology dramatically accelerated the 
encroaching on the other world by the positive term of the antagonism; the pre-modern 
and un-enlightened world shriveled away. The last grand antagonism to dissolve was 
that between the West and the Communist world. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, we 
have lost the other world as such; there is no longer a world outside capitalism. And is 
this not precisely the source of the insecurity that Lasch describes? As the other world 
disappeared, did not the modern subject lose the backbone of his or her subjectivity, the 
outer world thus becoming a mirror of the disoriented subject? This would mean that 
Lasch‖s diagnosis of the narcissistic personality only becomes fully blown in today‖s 
post-Cold War, globalized world, showing, once again, that post-modernity is the culmi-
nation of modernity. Of course one can argue that there are still antagonisms. We need 
only think of how, in identity politics, the minority group is said to function as the oth-
er. It seems, however, that none of these post-modern antagonisms really opens up 
another space. Global space is unified under capitalism, the common denominator of 
both McDonald‖s and McJihad (Mitchell, 2002).  
To understand this closing down of the other world, some of Žižek‖s remarks in his 
foreword to the Croatian edition of The Culture of Narcissism are very enlightening (Žižek, 
1986).7 There Žižek writes that Lasch failed to supply us with a sufficient theoretical de-
finition of the turning point in late capitalism which corresponds to the transition of 
organization man to pathological Narcissus. For Žižek, this turning point is the post-
industrial transformation of the bureaucratic capitalist society of the 1940s and 1950s 
into a society described as permissive. Following Jaques-Alain Miller‖s suggestion that 
science, in various different forms, from expert advice to microelectronic gadgets, has 
become a constituent part of the everyday Lebenswelt (life-world; Miller, 2005), Žižek 
(1986) points out that “the blending of Lebenswelt with science radically undermines the 
very notion of Lebenswelt as a field of everyday pre-scientific self-understanding and 
pre-theoretical life practice, from which science derives its meaning”. If our life-world 
has become inherently defined by science, then there is, by definition, nothing outside 
its grasp. For Žižek, any reference to a pre-scientific Lebenswelt corresponds to nothing 
less then a Blut und Boden ideology. Against this, he draws on Husserl to argue that 
“science as such, in the strict hermeneutic sense of the word, is unsignifying and as soon 
                                                          
 
 
7 Žižek‖s authorship of the introduction to the Croatian edition of The Culture of Narcissism seems indicative of 
the fact that he is quite indebted to Lasch. This influence is apparent in, for example, his approach to virtuali-
ty (Žižek, 1995), his use of the maternal superego (Žižek, 1991) and his leftist critique of the political correct-
ness of the mainstream Left (Žižek, 2002). 
as it inherently begins to encroach on the Lebenswelt, the whole loses its meaning and 
we find ourselves in a void.” Science has not replaced the life-world or provided it with 
another signifying horizon; it has emptied the world of meaning. Miller (2005) qualifies 
this omnipresence of science in everyday life as answers without questions. Žižek sees this 
feature at work in three partial characteristics of our contemporary age: the role of ex-
perts in everyday life, the proliferation of micro-electronic gadgets, and advertising. 
This flood of answers engenders a longing to escape from this suffocating grip of science 
and technology, the longing to re-establish an authentic pre-scientific area within the 
life-world. This cult of authenticity, of course, cannot but be recuperated to that which 
it was endeavouring to escape:  
The basic paradox of the contemporary “cult of authenticity” is that its inner con-
stitution and driving force are a bunch of manuals which, by appearing scientifi-
cally legitimate, give the subject prescriptions on how to attain his authenticity, 
how to liberate the “creative potentials of his Ego”, how to cast his mask and re-
veal his “real Ego”, and how to turn to intuitive spontaneity and genuineness. 
(Žižek, 1986)  
It is this cult of authenticity which I claim Lasch eventually did not surpass and that we 
must historicize. We should try to situate this ontological quest against the gradual en-
croaching of science on the life-world. Perhaps then it will be possible to locate the 
shifting positions of the subject. This basic antagonism of life-world and science allows 
us to better understand contemporary shifts in symptomatology and subjectivity. We 
will attempt to outline three such shifts.  
To begin with one can say that in the course of modernity the Lebenswelt only came 
gradually to be under the sway of science. The hysterical symptoms which Freud en-
countered might have been the last vestiges of preacademia which, at the same time, 
functioned as a mediator between Science and the Lebenswelt. The hegemonic discourse, 
the transferential setting, was that of science, medical science in particular. In Lacanian 
terms, the transference was situated in the discourse of the master.8 The hysterical symp-
                                                          
 
 
8 In his seminar “L‖envers de la psychanalyse” (Seminar XVII), Lacan (1969–1970/ 2007) distinguished four 
discourses: the discourse of the master, the university, the hysteric, and the analyst. The discourse of the hys-
teric is the discourse of fundamental dividedness (the Freudian “Spaltung”): for example, the patient bringing 
his or her symptom into the social as a question. The addressee of the hysteric is the discourse of the master, 
where the master, for example the doctor, produces knowledge as the (structurally failing) answer to the 
symptom of the hysteric. The shift in the university discourse is that the gathered scientific knowledge stands 
in the place of the actor. There, the so-called “master-signifier” is denied or hidden. The knowledge presents 
itself as plain and neutral, disavowing the performative gesture of the production of knowledge. In the dis-
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tom, with its reference to the dark, pre-scientific Lebenswelt, on the one hand solicited 
the scientist‖s clarifications but, on the other, it defied science. Paralyses, for example, 
were presented which no organic lesion could explain, migrating to other body parts 
after initial successful treatments. The hysterical symptom was the question without ans-
wer par excellence, defying the very structure of scientific discourse.  
The second development in modern symptomatology can be seen to be connected to 
the further encroachment on the space of the Lebenswelt. At a certain point, symptoms 
became no longer signs of something pre-scientific on which science could shed some 
light. Rather, symptoms came to emerge directly in the language of science itself. Here 
the diagnosis of borderline personality disorder is exemplary. Originating from a confu-
sion on the part of clinicians who were encountering symptoms they could not situate 
in the then standard dichotomy neurosis/psychosis, the diagnosis of borderline perso-
nality disorder rapidly became the first trend in the psy-world. Not only was it detected 
everywhere, it was also the first diagnosis to be known by a broad lay public, thus be-
coming one of the first popular self-diagnoses. The symptoms were offered in the trans-
ference not to a master discourse, but to science itself. That is to say, the symptoms were 
situated within the discourse of the university. Lay individuals became psychology stu-
dents, offering their symptoms to senior scientists, as answers to be questioned, as pheno-
mena to be tackled by academic programmes.  
And are we not, quite recently, experiencing yet a third shift in symptomatology? 
Clinicians, as Verhaeghe points out, encounter panic disorders, somatization disorders, 
eating disorders, addictions, and self-mutilation. Are these contemporary symptoms, 
termed ADHD (Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder), CFS (Chronic Fatigue Syn-
drome), and PTSS (Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome), unmediated, pure symptoms? 
Have we finally done away with the old transferential settings, so that behind the Freu-
dian, Jungian, Lacanian, or other veils the real symptoms are now laid bare? Do today‖s 
symptoms thus lack the dimension of the signifier, as Verhaeghe (2007) contends? We 
should, however, renounce these claims. The signifiers in play are precisely those of 
science. For does not the fact that today‖s symptoms come in abbreviations testify to 
their discursive structure? In today‖s clinic, we are not dealing with pure, unmediated 
anxiety. We still need to look for the discursive structure, and here it is to be found in 
the DSM, which is widely disseminated in the popular press and on the internet. This 
time the framework is, thus, fully situated in science. Today the encroachment of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
course of the analyst it is not knowledge which is put to work. Within the transference the analyst assumes 
the place of the object of desire of the analysand, which is to say he or she keeps this place empty in order to 
make it possible for the analysand to know about his or her desire. 
science on the life-world is complete. Contemporary symptomatology is not situated in 
the domain of the life-world, nor in the intersection of the life-world with science as it 
was in the second shift; today‖s symptoms are to be situated within a unified field he-
gemonized by science. This means that symptoms are not offered in the classical trans-
ference of the discourse of the master as answerless questions. Nor are they simply offered in 
the discourse of the university to authorities in psychology as questioned answers. Today 
symptoms are not to be discussed within a shared academic field; they only need to be 
acknowledged as scientific facts. Treatment is the reserve of the super-expert who 
treats only the body. While in the second shift, we still had a subject connected 
to/disconnected from his or her symptoms, the subject now need only present his or 
her body to the super-experts, or, more properly, to the super-technicians, as an already 
answered technical question. Here La Mettrie‖s subject as the zero level of subjectivity is 
finally reached.  
What, then, is the proper term for the transferential setting in the third shift? If it 
can be understood in terms of neither the discourse of the master nor the discourse of 
the university, then how should we understand it? In concrete terms, contemporary 
symptoms can be understood to be addressed to the pharmacological discourse, a dis-
course which is effectively a symbiosis of academia and capitalism. To remain within the 
four discourses as delimited by Lacan, we could follow Miller‖s suggestion that the dis-
course of the analyst has become, in a subverted way, the dominant discourse in our socie-
ty. The general social discourse is no longer the other side of psychoanalysis, but, ra-
ther, its accomplishment. According to Miller (2005, pp. 8–9), the interpretive and sub-
versive power of the analytic discourse has turned society in the direction of the dis-
course of the analyst. If in Lacanian terms the analyst occupies the position of the object 
of desire (object a) in order that the analysand can discover his or her desire, then, owing 
to the interpretive and subversive power of psychoanalysis, this objet a has come to hold 
the dominant place in society. It has become society‖s compass (Miller, 2005, p. 6). This 
would mean that hypermodern civilization is not so accurately characterized as thera-
peutic society as it would be as analytic society. If we follow this logic to the end, we can 
then say that objet petit a is exactly what the questionless answers of science are about. It 
is in this context, in society structured as the discourse of the analyst, that contempo-
rary symptoms are offered as answered questions.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Various authors have suggested that contemporary symptoms are not amenable to the 
classical Freudian approach of transference and interpretation. Such writers propose 
that where the traditional historicizing and transferential framework is lacking, the 
work of construction or synthesis is necessary with the express aim of introducing the 
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dimension of the signifier (see Verhaeghe, 2007). On the one hand we could ask what 
range of subject positions would then be promoted? What, that is, might be the ethical 
implications of the production of subject-prostheses by the super-expert or super-
technician? On the other hand, we should appreciate that there is a historical and dis-
cursive framework in operation here. As we have already argued, it is not that contem-
porary symptoms are lacking signifiers. On the contrary, it is the signifiers and the his-
tory of the psy-sciences themselves which haunt late-modern subjectivity and sympto-
matology. Should psychoanalysis not, thus, resist the temptation to engage in some de-
finitive position beyond Freud, resist the temptation to search for an ultimate and un-
mediated ground of the symptom? For this would be to forget that our subject is the 
modern subject, the subject of the sciences, or, more explicitly, the subject as the very 
remainder of the encroaching of the sciences on our life-world. If it is only today that 
the real meaning of modern subjectivity fully blossoms, then the first task is to defend 
this zero level of subjectivity, in its very status of zero-ness, vis-à-vis all kind of at-
tempts at construction or synthesis.  
In this sense, Lasch was absolutely right in psychologizing psychologization, in show-
ing that in psychologization one should lay bare the psychological as the Spaltung as 
such. His insistence on the “social origins of the suffering” opened up, albeit momenta-
rily, the perspective of a critique of psychological politics. However, Lasch lost himself 
in meta-psychology, in his refusal to think his own stance through to the end. One can 
rightly criticize Lasch for his essentialism and for substantializing late-modern subjec-
tivity. That is, one can criticize him for assuming the position of master. One should, 
however, avoid the opposite trap of adopting a position of pure anti-essentialism, claim-
ing that his recourse to the Freudian discursive complexes represents but only one possi-
ble modern subject position. This conventionalism, of course, would be to allow the 
perspective of master in again by the back door, insofar as it would be to claim an abso-
lute viewpoint from which the different contingent subject positions could be dis-
cerned.  
Some anti-anti-essentialist input is thus needed to show that Freudian theory touch-
es the truth or, in Lacanian terms, touches the Real. As noted above, Freud‖s psychoana-
lysis played a central role in the emergence of modernity. So it is history, not historic-
ism, that can show that the Freudian subject is foremost an elaboration of the Cartesian 
subject. Freud laid bare the truth of the Enlightened subject; his conception of the un-
consciousness explored the limits of the Cartesian project. But the truths of psychoana-
lysis are of such a nature that they refuse any usefulness (Brockelman, 2003). So for the 
Left, as the heir of the great emancipatory theories, psychoanalysis plays an important 
but problematic role. The Freudian skandalons (the unconsciousness, infantile sexuality, 
the death drive, etc.) are not amenable to positive operationalization; they stand in the 
way of a psychoanalytically inspired production of political alternatives. A critique of 
political psychology is doomed to fail. The fact that Lasch balanced on the tightrope be-
tween nostalgia and conservatism is testament to this fundamental problem. Psychoa-
nalysis and its skandalons are in this way part of the fundamental trauma of the Left. 
Contrary, then, to Lasch, who still reserves some positive potential for psychoanalysis 
to formulate visions of “good society and democratic citizenship” (Lasch, 1981), it 
should be clear that, where the truth of the skandalons of psychoanalysis is acknowl-
edged, psychoanalysis‖s effectiveness ends, and this is precisely where politics proper 
should enter. It is only in this way that the two-dimensional deadlock of a Lebenswelt 
petrified by science can be opened up. It is only in this way that we can escape the repe-
titive bouncing back and forth between Lasch‖s plea to keep science out of the Lebens-
welt and current mainstream psychology‖s plea to keep the Lebenswelt out of science 
(the APA argument for a politics-free, science-based education).  
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